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ABSTRACT
A number of pre-existing teams are trained to operate in crisis. These
teams can be found in aviation, navy, nuclear power, offshore oil, air traffic
control facilities, and trauma centers. Understanding how to support pre-existing
teams like these, with IT is essential. To date, most support for these teams is
automation support such as an electronic checklist for an airplane flight crew
responding to an engine fire rather than collaboration support such as linking
paramedics in the field to doctors in emergency rooms. While automated support
is rapidly developing, very little consideration has been given to enhancing the
collaboration support for teams that face crisis. With advances in network
capacity and sensors, IT has enabled pre-existing teams that face crisis the
opportunity to obtain collaboration support from others in the organization.
Collaboration with other human experts is necessary to aid problem discovery
and to consider ramifications of responses. Here we suggest a preliminary set of
IT system guiding principles to support collaboration for a particular, but
common type of pre-existing team that faces crisis. These principles are based on
two frameworks that have been developed to mitigate the effects of crisis. One is
an organizational approach called the High Reliability Organization (HRO); the
other, a team approach, was developed in the aviation community known as
Crew Resource Management (CRM). Here we briefly explain each approach,
highlight their principles, and then suggest principles of a Collaboration Crisis
IT (CCIT) system to support the collaboration needs of teams that face crisis.
INTRODUCTION
Advances in IT have enabled the
creation of new types of organizational teams

(Fulk and DeSanctis 1995; Jarvenpaa and Ives
1994). In addition, organizations are engaging
in high risk activities as the business
environment becomes more complex and the
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rewards increase for successful high stakes
processes (Morrison, Kelly, Moore, and
Hutchins 2000; Weick and Sutcliffe 2001). To
mitigate this risk, organizations increasingly
rely on highly trained teams to manage high
stakes processes in which a crisis may occur
(Serfaty, Entin, and Johnston 1998; Seeger et
al. 2003). Unfortunately, research on these
types of teams and their IT needs is rare as
most crisis research has studied environmental
or terrorism events (Turoff, Chumer, Van de
Walle, and Yao 2004), organizational
responses to crisis (Hale, Dulek and Hale
2005; Kim 1998), or other types of crisis
teams such as interorganizational teams (Aedo
et al. 2006; Chen and Dahanayake 2006),
technology teams (De Bruijne, Van Eeten,
Roe, and Schulman 2006) and disaster
recovery teams (Robert and Lajtha 2002).
Finally, still other research has investigated
particular examples of these teams such as
flight crews, firefighters, or paramedics

(Helmreich 2000, McKinney 2004).
While large scale disasters and
organizational crises may last several weeks,
here our focus is on the immediate response to
a crisis by a particular but common type of
pre-existing team of professionals. These crisis
teams can be found in civilian aviation, the
merchant navy, the nuclear power industry,
aviation maintenance, the offshore oil
industry, air traffic control facilities, trauma
centers, medicine, fire fighting agencies, law
enforcement,
counter
terrorism
units,
emergency rooms, combat units, container
inspection teams at ports, and homeland
security teams. These teams share distinct
features: they are comprised of a small number
of highly trained professionals within one
organization, they are co-located at the site of
the crisis, the team is trained to face lifethreatening risk, the team has the authority to
make the key decisions which are typically
irreversible, the team has a prior history of

CONTRIBUTION
This paper contributes to IS research in a number of ways. To our best knowledge, it is
the first IS crisis paper that examines a particular type of preexisting team. Most all other
crisis and IS research addresses large scale disasters, organizational responses, or crisis teams
with other characteristics (e.g. ad hoc, widely dispersed or interorganizational teams). During
a time of increased terror activities, natural disasters, and man made crises, supporting this
common but particular type of team with a conceptually sound IT system is both possible and
important.
Secondly, to our knowledge this work is the first IS study to site Crew Resource
Management (CRM) research. IS research has long investigated and supported team
behaviors. However, this body of research has not used insights developed by CRM
researchers investigating flight deck team interactions. Most IS crisis team research has
focused on ad hoc teams, or organizational teams not in crisis.
Finally, most of the limited research to date on teams in crisis has focused on automated
support. One example of a preexisting team is a flightdeck crew. For these teams research has
emphasized automated support such as computer displays, electronic checklists, or access to
archived knowledge. Here we suggest that with advances in sensor and network capabilities,
robust IS systems can be developed that support collaboration needs of preexisting teams with
other professionals outside of the crisis environment.
By identifying a type of previously unstudied team (a particular, but most common type
of preexisting team in crisis), an underserved need (collaboration), and new body of research
(CRM), we hope to begin a discussion that will lead to development and design of an
important new type of team IS. To that end, this study provides an initial list of guiding
principles for IT systems to support the collaboration needs of teams in crisis.
This research is expected to be interesting to IS researchers building IT solutions for
professional teams in industries with substantial risk. It may prove interesting to a broader
audience as it identifies an increasingly common type of professional team for whom
technology solutions can be developed.
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work together during routine operations, and
the team can collaborate with other
professionals not physically located with them.
While research has supported each of these
teams, this report is the first to classify them
into a particular type for the purpose of
making suggestions common to all. The most
significant differences among pre-existing
teams, large scale, and organizational crises
are summarized in Table 1.
The types of crisis are not completely
independent. Large scale disasters are often
the impetus for the creation of organizational
and pre-existing team crisis. The 9/11 disaster
put organizations such as the New York Police
and Fire Departments in a crisis as well as a
number of their pre-existing teams such as fire
fighters and riot control teams. In addition,
these three levels of crisis also share several
characteristics. At each level decision makers
face high risk and make binding decisions
under time pressure and in short time horizons
with incomplete information. Further, for each
level, everything in a crisis is an exception to
the norm (Turoff et al. 2004). Because these
crisis types share some common elements, a
number of IT system design principles
identified for large scale crisis should be
considered for pre-existing teams. These
guidelines are not repeated in the text of this
report (see Appendix A for a list of design

principles for a Dynamic Emergency Response
Management IS (Turoff et al. 2004)).
As mentioned, there are other types of
teams that respond to crisis. For example
distributed teams of IT professionals from a
variety of organizations may be called on to
respond to a security threat to the Internet, or a
top level crisis response team may have to
respond to a large scale disaster. These teams
are important to study also, but are not
included here as they differ in important ways
from our pre-existing teams. These differences
include a number of characteristics, such as
loosely organized, varying degrees of
familiarity, physically dispersed, not life
threatening, and longer time horizon.
Collaboration
Collaborative support for pre-existing
teams in the past was limited by the available
technology (e.g. compatible radios and phone
systems). Historically, flight crews, fire
fighting teams, or emergency room units could
not be collaboratively supported as only the
team in crisis knew the local conditions and
had access to the stand alone computers that
produced and manipulated the crisis data.
Teams in crisis had only their immediate
resources at hand or preprogrammed
automated support. Now, with advances in
network capacity and sensors, IT has stretched
that hand and teams that face crisis can obtain

Table 1: Types and Attributes of Crisis

Examples
Recent Studies in Crisis
Literature

Large Scale Disaster
Crisis
9/11; Katrina; Bhopal,
Three Mile Island
Hale et al. 2005; Turoff
2002

Characteristics of
Context

Widespread, multiple
organizations, many
lives at stake, crisis
responders move to
location, key decisions
made over weeks

Characteristics of
Decision Makers

Dispersed, unknowable
prior, informal
hierarchy, hundreds of
actors, from local state,
or federal agencies and
private organizations

Organizational Crisis

Pre-existing Team Crisis

Enron; NASA; Firestone

Aviation, surgery

Weick & Sutcliffe 2001;
Venette, Sellnow, &
Lang 2003
Single organization,
important external
communication needed,
organizational survival
at stake, decisions made
over days

None

Centralized, formal
hierarchy, tens of actors,
from one organization
(public or private)

Localized actions, hi
tech system or personal
breakdown, crisis team
present prior to crisis
initiation, all decisions
short time horizon made
by one or two hours
Co-located formal
hierarchy, few actors,
highly trained, from one
organization (public or
private)

Journal of Information Technology Theory and Application (JITTA), 9:3, 2008. 41

Earl McKinney

collaboration support from others in the
organization (Chen and Dahanayake 2006).
These organizational experts can now see realtime data from the crisis, interact with
knowledge bases, and reliably and richly
communicate with the team.
Collaboration allows participants to
impose a shard view, apply specific
understandings and meanings, and evolve their
own organizing approaches to a problem
(Turoff et al. 1997). A collaborating team
works together to support common objectives
(Carver and Turoff 2007). Collaborating teams
in general and pre-existing teams in particular
share data, information, and knowledge via
computational resources, and persistent
databases for the purpose of taking an action
on behalf of an organization (McQuay 2004).
Organizations seek to increase collaboration
for their crisis teams as it allows knowledge to
be shared without exposure to risk, and it
makes vital expertise more widely available.
IT Support
To support teams designed to respond
to crisis, organizations seek to leverage
advances in information technology. Currently
IT support for these types of teams includes
display systems (Hamblin 2003; Sarter and
Schroeder 2001; Vicente 2003), intelligent
support systems (Koester and Mehl 2003;
Palmer and Degani 2001;Wischusen et al.
2003), decision support systems (Smith,
Johnson, and Paris 2004), and a wide variety
of other technical solutions (Song 2006; Stoner
et al. 2004). A particularly intriguing example
of this type of support is a system for
efficiently planning traversals of planetary
surfaces by astronauts (Marquez et al. 2005).
These advances can be classified as
automation support to the team (e.g. an
electronic checklist for an airplane flight crew
responding to an engine fire), or collaboration
support such as linking paramedics in the field
to doctors at hospitals. While significant
progress is occurring to give automated
support to pre-existing teams in crisis, very
little consideration has been given to
enhancing the collaboration support for this
type of team in crisis (Huang 2004;
Nunamaker 1997). This lack of attention
continues despite recent crisis studies that
suggest that even simple tools for
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collaboration such as communication systems
have performed poorly (Netten and van
Someren 2006).
Collaboration is essential in a crisis
because of the nature of the task. Crises are
unexpected, unpracticed, and unprogrammable
(McKinney and Davis 2003). For example, for
flight crews, an engine failure or low oil
temperature on an engine may be an
emergency, examples of crisis include being
shot, a terrorist attack, or responding to novel
combinations of technical systems failures.
Emergencies are predefined and therefore
amenable to automated support. With an
emergency, responders know what is wrong.
Responders can be trained to accomplish a
specific process and automated IT systems can
be designed to support the programmed
response. Crisis, by its uniqueness, reduces the
utility of automated support. The challenges in
all three levels of crisis are figuring out what is
happening,
dealing
with
incomplete
information, thinking through irrevocable
decisions and making them before it‘s too late.
As a result, automated support, while valuable,
should not be the only available support for
teams that face crisis. Collaboration with other
human experts is necessary to aid problem
discovery and to consider ramifications of
responses.
For these teams, collaboration typically
occurs within one organization. For example,
flightdeck crews use electronic checklists
during routine and crisis operations that can be
displayed and tracked by organizational
members on the ground. Emergency room
systems are developed by hospitals to provide
real time support to the medical team in
routine operations and during crisis situations.
As a result the system can be tailored to a
particular organization and can avoid the
common design challenge of having to
develop a system that is meaningful and useful
to wide range of team members from various
organizations..
A collaborative crisis IT system is the
interface between an organization and its preexisting team, permitting both routine and
crisis collaboration between physically distant
organizational members and the team in crisis.
Collaboration implies that the system brings
organizational assets and the team together to
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resolve the crisis. While team characteristics
are important to IT design, understanding and
supporting organizational crisis related
activities is also vital to successful IT design.
Collaboration for our type of preexisting team has distinct characteristics that
must be considered in order to support them
well. For example, collaboration with preexisting teams is mostly synchronous. Further,
collaboration occurs within a pre-existing
hierarchical structure within the pre-existing
team.
Finally,
organizations
identify
individuals of the team that will be leaders and
decision makers during the crisis (e.g.
captains, officers, line officers etc.).
Effects of Crisis on Teams and Individuals
Before it is possible to consider IT
enabled collaborative support for teams that
face crisis, it is necessary to understand the
crisis task. A crisis is an unexpected, low
probability, uncertain, unpracticed event with
life and death consequences under time
pressure with potentially irreversible decisions
(Pearson and Clair 1998; Rosenthal 1991). A
crisis typically unfolds as a person has an
intention, takes action, and misunderstands the
world. Actual events fail to coincide with the
intended sequence, and there is an unexpected
outcome. A crisis typically involves three

phases: prevention, response and recovery
(Hale et al. 2005). Further, the crisis event is
just one of many concurrent activities for
which the team is responsible. These other
activities or responsibilities, as well as the
crisis event itself constitute a crisis event.
System design must recognize these
concurrent responsibilities. For example, flight
deck teams must continue to operate aircraft
systems, navigate, and communicate in
addition to accomplishing crisis related tasks.
While accomplishing these tasks, responders
are under the influence of a number of well
known psychological effects. Crisis affects
individuals in a number of ways. Here, the
individual and team effects are reviewed. A
brief listing of these effects is shown below in
Table 2. For a more complete review see
Morrison et al. (1998) or Olson and Sarter
(2001).
Research has demonstrated a number of
significant cognitive and behavioral effects of
crisis on individuals. A crisis can narrow
attention, information search, and deliberation
or debate (Cohen 1980). Individuals focus
attention on the immediate, highly structured
task elements and avoid more important and
more complex tasks (Morrison et al. 1998).
The stress of a crisis limits the

Table 2: Psychological Challenges of Crisis
narrows information search and restricts deliberation or debate
restricts attention to immediate, highly structured task and not more important and complex tasks
limits ability to notice patterns
situations are difficult to remember in sufficient detail long enough to recognize the emerging pattern
a lack or poor quality of cues makes it difficult to hypothesize the nature and severity of the problem
perceptual narrowing, reduced use of available cues, decreased vigilance, reduction in working memory
restricts the examination and evaluation of multiple possible hypotheses
time is compressed, events seem ambiguous and uncertain
changes the communication patterns of teams
communication is upward (from subordinate to leader)
Implicit communication increases
teams shift from an egalitarian horizontal communication framework to a more classical hierarchical
subordinates more willing to defer to authority
group leader increases receptivity to information from subordinates
new patterns of communication are necessary to correct errors during crisis
prone to latch upon the first good idea that comes along
time pressure is likely to inhibit joint problem solving
members reach agreements sooner, but they make fewer offers and reach poorer joint outcomes
important social or interpersonal cues (such as attention to others‘ requests or actions) are neglected
likely to shift to a more individualistic self-focus, resulting in poorer overall team performance
members may revert to well learned or dominant responses that may be quite inappropriate
threat rigidity—restriction in information processing, constriction of control (Staw et al. 1981)
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individual‘s ability to notice patterns, as the
important features of a developing situation
are difficult to remember in sufficient detail
long enough to recognize the emerging pattern
(Morrison et al. 1998). Poor quality of cues
can make it difficult to generate reasonable
hypothesis about the nature and severity of the
problem (Olson and Sarter 2001). Crisis can
lead to perceptual narrowing and a reduced use
of available cues, decreased vigilance, and
reduction in working memory capacity.
Further, a reduction in attentional resources
restricts the examination and evaluation of
multiple possible hypotheses (Sarter and
Schroeder 2001). As attention narrows,
peripheral (less relevant) task cues are first
ignored followed by restriction of more central
or task relevant cues. Individuals display threat
rigidity, a reliance on well learned or dominant
responses that may be quite inappropriate
(Staw, Sandelands, and Dutton 1981). For
individuals in crisis, time is compressed;
information is incomplete ambiguous and
uncertain. Individuals tend to miss important
patterns as perception narrows and working
memory is reduced.
While these effects have been shown to
lead to poorer performance, crisis behaviors do
have some positive attributes. Cognitive
absorption ability increases to allow
individuals to work with more information,
and narrowing of attention may help
participants focus on a specific task without
devoting mental resources to other tasks
(Agarwal and Karahanna 2000).
Crisis also has team effects. Individuals
were less likely to help or assist others
(Matthews and Canon 1975). Stress reduces
subjects‘ ability to discriminate among people
occupying different roles (Rotton et al. 1978).
Time pressure inhibits joint problem solving
(Walton and McKersie 1965) and leads to
greater self-focused attention (Wegner and
Giuiliano 1980). Under high time pressure,
team members reach agreements sooner, but
these solutions are typically sub optimal. Team
tasks require attention to both direct taskrelated activities and social or teamwork
activities
such
as
coordination
and
communication. Thus, the narrowing of
attentional focus under stress may have both
cognitive and social effects. As important
social or interpersonal cues, (such as attention
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to others‘ requests or actions) are neglected,
team performance suffers. In fact, Driskell,
Salas, and Johnston (1999) found that team
members were less likely to maintain a broad
team perspective under stress and were more
likely to shift to a more individualistic selffocus, resulting in poorer overall team
performance (Driskell et al. 2001).
Crisis also affects team communication
behaviors (Hale et al. 2005; Thompkins and
Thompkins 2004). A review of team crisis
research shows that crisis changes the
communication patterns of teams. One change
is that during a crisis more communication is
upward (from subordinate to leader) than in
routine operations. In addition, during a crisis,
implicit communication increases and teams
shift
from an egalitarian horizontal
communication framework to a more classical
hierarchical and vertical structure (Weick
1990). Similarly, Davis, Driskell and Salas
(1991) found that crisis made subordinates
more willing to defer to authority. They
hypothesized that this increased deferment to
centralized authority is due to both social
comparison (the leader is of higher stature)
and concentration of responsibility (the leader
has to answer for this).
Further,
new
patterns
of
communication are necessary for teams to
correct errors during crisis. According to
Weick (1990), in any crisis there is a high
probability that false hypotheses will develop
and persist. What is needed is diversity of
inputs and hypotheses about ―what is going
on‖ (Weick and Sutcliffe 2001) as a chief
characteristic of early stage crisis is the
ambiguity and uncertainty of the cues. The
human mind naturally seeks to resolve
dissonance (Festinger and Carlsmith 1959) and
is therefore prone to latch upon the first
―good‖ idea that comes along during a crisis
(Jehn 1999). This is particularly likely to occur
if someone in authority introduces the idea
(Kern 1997). Weick (1990) suggests that it is
largely through open exchange of messages,
independent verification, and redundancy that
the existence of false hypotheses can be
detected and corrected. These studies suggest
crisis increases and alters the communication
among team members.
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Outline
Next, we suggest a comprehensive and
theoretical set of principles to guide IT design
of systems to support the collaboration needs
of pre-existing teams that face crisis. These
principles are derived from two main sources.
The first is High Reliability Organizational
research. The second, and less well known
source, is from the aviation domain. It is
known as Crew Resource Management (CRM)
research. The collaborative IT system must
support both organizational and team needs,
HRO principles support the former, CRM
principles the later.
High Reliability Organization (HRO)
research seeks to describe and improve the
activities and processes for organizations that
face crisis (Bourrier 1996; Fiol and O‘Connor
2003, Swanson and Ramiller 2004; Vogus and
Welbourne 2003). This research suggests five
activities. These include preoccupation with
failure, reluctance to simplify interpretations,
sensitivity to operations, commitment to
resilience, and deference to expertise.
Supporting crisis teams with IT should be
based
on
these
five
organizational
characteristics.

While support for these organizational
activities is important to crisis team success, it
is also valuable to consider what might, by
contrast, be labeled team-only needs. The
activities of teams in crisis have been the
object of military and airline flightdeck
research for 25 years. This research effort,
labeled Crew Resource Management (CRM),
suggests that team-only needs might include
situational awareness, decision making,
communication, team work, resource use and
leadership.
Many of the following examples of HRO and
CRM principles are from the aviation domain.
The aviation community performs thousands
of successful flights under difficult conditions
and this research setting has matured to the
point where a wide range of cases and
examples have been written (Ginnett 1993;
Helmreich, Merritt, and Wilhelm 1999). These
examples and insights have been applied
beyond the flightdeck--to teams solving
organizational
problems,
emerging
management teams, and IT teams that develop
and maintain large scale computer programs
(Boehm-Davis, Holt, and Seamster 2001;
Davies 2001). The principles for a Crisis IT
system for each field are listed in Table 3.

Table 3: Principles of a Crisis IT system
HRO Principles
Record widespread and detailed accounts of near misses or errors that captures new attributes
Track and display a wide variety of unsimplified data and disconfirming evidence for a variety of expert
interpretation by team and organizational participants
Increase the visibility of operational performance measures that lead to operational enhancements and build
an IT system to adapt to these operational enhancements
Create a flexible system that enables simultaneous action and analysis with mental simulation of courses of
action for both team and organizational participants
Identify, and alert experts with on going problems and support collaboration and analysis between crisis
team and experts
CRM Principles
The system should be simple to use and not overly filter or over process the original data
Help reduce mental effort by supporting feature matching and adaptive story telling.
Display historical trends, minimize calculations, and support chunking of information in order to reduce
cognitive overload
Provide a mechanism to direct the attention of an operator to important events while minimizing the
cognitive costs of interruption
Mitigate the tendency of decision makers to attend to only confirming information
Compensate for deficiencies in action selection and adaptively support the multiple cycles of decision
making
Enable and support communication value sharing
Aid increased vertical communication, effective dissent, and alternative hypothesis generation during crisis
Enhance accuracy and sharing of common models on the state of affairs
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CCIT SYSTEM GUIDING PRINCIPLES
HRO-Organizational Activities and CCIT
System Principles
Weick, Sutcliffe and Obstfeld (1999)
originated the HRO framework. High
reliability organizations operate under
constantly threatening conditions. HROs are
typically
interactively
complex
with
unpredictable,
but
highly
dependent
interactions of subsystems (Perrow 1994).
These organizations are labeled highly reliable
because they have lower than expected
accidents or incidents. Typical organizations
cited as HROs are nuclear power aircraft
carriers, air traffic control centers, and power
plants, organizations that operate large
physical objects. Interestingly each of these
organizations employs pre-existing teams.
These organizations are not free of errors, but
errors do not disable it (Van den Eede, Van de
Walle, and Rutkowski 2006). HROs seem to
share a number of activities and processes. Of
the five HRO principles described below, the
first three address crisis prevention while the
fourth deals with response and the fifth speaks
to crisis recovery.
1. Preoccupation with failure
Members of HROs are anxious about
failure and distrust success. As a result, they
constantly seek to identify lapses or minor
incidents that, if ignored, might later reoccur
and contribute to a crisis. This preoccupation
with failure is impervious to success and does
not become stale. Members of HROs
recognize that success can narrow perception
and breed overconfidence. This misplaced
confidence in judgment and in its existing
procedures can limit necessary changes to the
organization and its processes.
One way HROs fight the lethargy of
success is by building and motivating
participation in attribution-free error reporting
procedures. Anyone in the organization can
report errors of any magnitude and are assured
that those errors will not lead to sanction.
These error reports are never automatically or
thoughtlessly processed by the HRO. Rather
the data collected are turned into active
incident reviews and in depth analysis that are
widely communicated.
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An error reporting system derived from
a preoccupation with failure occurs in the
airline industry (Chidester 2003). The Aviation
Safety Reporting System (ASRS) is one
national system, and all major airlines have
their own internal systems. Pilots make inputs
to the systems via anonymous reports (see
ASRS at http://asrs.arc.nasa.gov/). Data from
these systems are then analyzed by trainers
and researchers. Their reports are widely
shared and the results of the studies have had
significant impacts (Gunther 2003). Results
from ASRS lead to new error frameworks and
mitigation processes (Chidester 2003).
Recently, these reports have helped build a
model of communication error in abnormal
situations (Haney and Gertman 2003; Muthard
and Wickens 2003).
These near misses and errors may
contain warnings of future problems but in the
din of daily activity appear as only weak
signals of impending crisis. The IT system
must be designed to find and amplify these
weak signals for the crisis team and their
collaborators to notice. Unfortunately, weak
signals, by their nature, are not readily found
as they defy easy classification or
categorization. If categories or attributes of
errors were already known to the organization,
the errors that occur would also be known and
procedures established to respond. For
example, jet engines break down, and
therefore airlines have learned to classify these
failures as engine problems. However, most
weak signals are not easily classified (e.g. a
small wing crack might be classified by length,
thickness, location or some other dimension).
As a result, most organizations can not
respond until the wing crack leads to a break
and a crisis occurs. Thus, the crisis IT system
should permit detailed descriptions or detailed
reporting of odd events, near misses, and weak
signals. From these details, common attributes,
such as the length of a ―must repair‖ crack can
later emerge, and teams can be trained to
respond effectively. Once these new attributes
are known, tolerances can be set for future
inspections and reporting, procedures can be
written for teams to use, and attention can shift
to finding new attributes or categories.
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System principle 1:
Record widespread and detailed
accounts of near misses or errors that captures
new attributes
2. Reluctance to simplify
High reliability organizations do not
simplify the complex events and processes in
which their teams participate. Although all
coordination requires some degree of
simplification, in HROs, participants minimize
this simplification and constantly seek to see
more, and render more complete and detailed
their understanding of their actions, processes
and the environment. Further, when actions are
taken or new processes put into place, they
avoid seeking confirming evidence that their
actions were appropriate. Rather, they seek
disconfirming evidence and new sources of
data that expectations and experience can
conspire to hide.
HROs generate disconfirming evidence
for their crisis teams by assigning members
with varied and overlapping backgrounds. The
variety in backgrounds and experiences tends
to increase scrutiny of data and thereby
increase the variety of what can be noticed.
With varied backgrounds comes varied
experiences and expectations and skepticism
of simplification. By creating teams with
members who have overlapping experiences
the team is more able to communicate what
they notice and see a more complete
perspective on their actions and the
environment. In addition to the variety of the
team, the search for disconfirming evidence is
also enhanced by a varied search of a wide
variety of sources. Therefore, an IT system
that limits simplification would have a variety
of sensors that records a variety of data for a
variety of participants.
System principle 2:
Track and display a wide variety of
unsimplified data and disconfirming evidence
for a variety of expert interpretation by team
and organizational participants
3. Widespread sensitivity to operations
HROs value operations above strategy.
This focus on operations, or processes (e.g.
communication) is designed to find hidden or

underlying lessons about weaknesses in the
operation. These latent failures may be found
in many operational areas including poor
supervision, inadequate procedures, and
deficient training. HROs also demonstrate
their commitment to operations by their focus
on correcting even minor issues. The result is
continuous improvement in operations. To
sustain this incremental improvement, HROs
seek operational suggestions from the entire
organization. They widely disseminate and
seek
feedback
on
both
operational
performance and performance measures. This
operational precedence is apparent in other
ways-- in the interest devoted to even small
interruptions in operations, in the numerous
meetings on operational status, and in
organization structure designed to broadly
distribute real time data about operations. The
DERMIS system introduced earlier also calls
for sensitivity to operations (Turoff et al.
2004). That system suggests collection and
analysis of event logs that track courses of
action during a crisis. This collection of events
would be in real time.
Effective hospital emergency rooms are
committed to operations and studies are
beginning to emerge that apply HRO
principles to hospitals (Gaba 2005; McKeon,
Oswaks, and Cunningham 2006). Doctors and
administrators collect and collaborate on a
wide variety of performance data to track
patient progress and optimize diagnosis under
crisis and expensive equipment use. Patient
surveys are collected, and inputs from the
entire organization are routinely obtained in
order to improve operational processes.
Despite constant strategic turmoil on
insurance,
liability,
and
government
intervention
issues,
emergency
room
procedures are continually improved by the
organization‘s commitment to operations.
IT systems supporting teams in crisis
should be designed to widely disseminate the
state of current operations within the
organization. The system should make
operational data, training schedules, equipment
use and other process information increasingly
available for oversight and improvement. This
should result in improvements to operational
procedures from a variety of sources. In
addition, one implication of continual process
change is that the IT system itself must
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change. Therefore, the system must be flexible
enough to adapt to changes to operations.
System principle 3:
Increase the visibility of operational
performance measures that lead to operational
enhancements and build an IT system to adapt
to these operational enhancements
4. Commitment to resilience
HROs are built on the premise that
error is unavoidable. As a result, HRO
managers take delight in putting out fires.
Unlike managers in other organizations who
see fire fighting as a breakdown of planning
and a sap on resources, HRO managers know
that recovery from mistake is their primary
activity. Because of this priority they seek
deep knowledge of their systems, processes
and people. In addition, they excel at adapting
to swift feedback, learning quickly without
multiple
errors,
recombining
existing
responses, and mentally simulating courses of
action. Further, they have learned to act while
diagnosing and to adapt to threats based on
feedback from action.
The professional aviation community
has realized that error is inevitable. In fact, one
report estimates the frequency of pilot error at
5-10 mistakes per hour (Amalberti 1996). As a
result, flight systems, training, technical
systems, and procedures are designed to
respond and recover from these errors. Further,
pilots are taught detailed knowledge about
their aircraft systems, and their environment in
order to more accurately diagnose crisis and
think through courses of action.
System principle 4:
Create a flexible system that enables
simultaneous action and analysis with mental
simulation of courses of action for both team
and organizational participants
5. Deference to expertise
As implied earlier, HROs intentionally
employ a wide variety of expertise to avoid
simplification when responding to crisis. Not
mentioned earlier is how HROs are organized
to deploy that expertise. Expertise is not
employed in a stiff organizational structure,
rather experts are expected to self organize
around a problem. In addition, they are
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permitted to make decisions and commitments
without multiple levels of supervision
common in more hierarchical organizations.
By pushing responsibility and authority down
and out to where the organization meets its
environment errors are caught earlier and
problems more rapidly addressed. Moreover,
when the signals emanating from the crisis are
noticed, experts can find the problem and
resolve it at a low level. Quick, accurate, and
expert decisions by those closest to the action
are emphasized. Westrum call this coordinate
leadership (Westrum 1997). In the DERMIS
model for large scale emergency response this
need is labeled Open Multi Directional
Communications. It is based on the concept
that during an emergency there is no way to
predict what information is going to be needed
and who is going to need it. That system
recognizes that online communities of experts
responding to a crisis will need a collaborative
communication system far beyond the
primitive group communication such as
discussion lists and email in use today.
An example of collaboration with
organizational expertise can be seen in outage
planning at a nuclear power plant (Bourrier
1996). The plant, Diablo Canyon, had no
detailed plan or predetermined structure to
deal with a power outage. Instead, the plant
depended on delegation of power to experts
supported by the complete availability of top
management. This flexibility permits problems
to quickly receive attention and appropriate
collaboration to emerge.
To support better use of expertise the
IT system for teams in crisis must permit data
and analysis to migrate to appropriate experts.
It should encourage crisis teams close to the
action to alert the right experts in the
organization about anomalies. As a result,
exception reporting, and other signals of
problems should not just go to team members
or executives but be shared widely within the
organization. This collaboration or ―reach
back‖ capability is a key concept in
responding to large scale disasters and military
operations (Chumer and Turoff 2006, Neal
2000).
In addition, the IT system must be
configurable
to
support
the
unique
collaboration needs of each crisis. In contrast
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to this need for unique structures, traditional
IT systems typically have the effect of making
organization decision making rigid and
predefined. The goal for a crisis system should
be to support the needs of both the crisis team
and their organizational expert collaborators.
Rather than emphasizing planning, an HRO
builds IT systems that can change with the
circumstances and handle new communication
processes on the fly.
Deference to expertise, like the other
four HRO principles, is an organizational
principle. This is not the same idea as the
individual behavior mentioned earlier labeled
deference to authority. Individuals on teams
during crisis tend to be more upward and
classically hierarchical in communication.
However, organizations supporting those
teams should rely on deference to experts,
allowing experts to self organize and
collaborate with the team.
System principle 5:
Identify, and alert experts with on
going problems and support collaboration and
analysis between crisis team and experts
CRM--Team Activities and CCIT System
Principles
Crew Resource Management (CRM)
seeks to find ways of mitigating human error
on the flightdeck (Wiener et al. 1993). Insights
from CRM have been credited with significant
reductions in aviation related mishaps and are
currently being exported to non aviation
domains such as operating rooms, merchant
navy,
and
fire
fighting
(http://www.wright.edu/isap/). One goal of this
current study is to bring CRM insights to the
attention of the crisis and IT research
communities.
CRM accepts individual error as
inevitable, but attempts to mitigate error by
training in decision making, communication,
and situational awareness as well as other
topics (Helmreich and Foushee 1993). These
topics form the conceptual breadth of CRM,
but CRM is also a methodology for employing
the concepts. This method involves
indoctrination and awareness training, practice
with feedback, and continuous reinforcement.
The method frequently employs flight
simulators to mimic actual emergencies and

crises, and instruction by domain experts who
have been educated on the CRM principles.
Finally, CRM involves both individual as well
as team capabilities. In fact, every CRM topic
has both an individual and team component.
For example, in decision making one pilot may
make ―the decision‖ but all crewmembers on
the team have input and other responsibilities.
CRM has been shown to be so effective that
both International and United States federal
oversight agencies now require CRM training
for flight crews (see ICAO 2002; FAR Part
121). Recently CRM insights have been
applied to medical teams (Gaba 2005;
Helmreich 2000; Sexton, Thomas, and
Helmreich 2000).
The principles of CRM can be clustered
into three general categories: decision making,
communication, and situational awareness.
Here we explain each, how it is used in
aviation as an example for crisis in general,
and the principles of an IT system designed to
support this team activity in any domain. CRM
has also developed principles beyond decision
making, communication, and situational
awareness such as workload sharing, stress,
leadership and others (Helmreich and Foushee
1993). These less central, less commonly
accepted activities are not discussed here in
order to focus IT system design on the most
essential activities. The principles outlined
below apply to both the physically collocated
team (e.g. the paramedics) and the extended
team (e.g. the doctors standing by in the
emergency room).
CRM literature is largely absent from
the information systems crisis response
research domain. Interested readers are
directed to several texts (Kern 2001; Salas et
al. 2001) as well as ongoing research
communities
(http://www.wright.edu/isap/;
http://homepage.psy.utexas.edu/homepage/
group/HelmreichLAB/;
http://www.crmdevel.org/)
6. Decision Making
CRM models of decision making in
crisis domains typically identify two primary
phases: situation assessment (what is
happening), and action selection (what to do
about it) (Tolcott 1992). More specifically,
situation assessment includes cue detection,
cue interpretation, and integration, while
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action
selection
subsumes
hypothesis
generation and selection (Smith et al. 2004).
The decision making process is described
elsewhere as observe, orient, decide, and act
(Hammond 2001; Turoff et al. 2006). This
process forms a loop when feedback creates
information input for another round of the
decision process (Transport Canada 2002).
Although one member of a team is typically
responsible for the decision, the decision
making process is considered a team process
as others on the team inform, check, and
deliberate with the decision maker.
Within the aviation community,
decision making instruction emphasizes both
individual characteristics such as decisiveness,
assertiveness, and critical thinking as well as
team attributes like legitimate dissent, think
aloud, and debate (for a more complete
exposition on flightdeck decision making see
Transport Canada 2002 and Wiener, Kanki,
and Helmreich 1993). Moreover, CRM
recognizes that making a decision during a
crisis requires the crew to overcome a number
of significant emotional and cognitive
challenges listed earlier in Table 1.
To compensate for these limitations, a
crisis IT system should support a wide range
of decision making activities and processes.
Fortunately, supporting the decision making
aspect of the crisis has received considerable
research attention compared to the other seven
crisis activities described here (see CannonBowers and Salas 1998; Kern 2001). Although
few systems have been constructed explicitly
for team crisis decision making, experimental
and theoretical studies have suggested the
following six distinct principles for supporting
decision making of teams in crisis with IT.
Simplify data, minimize filtering
Morrison et al. (1998) conducted an
empirical study of tactical displays for naval
officers responding to simulated threats. The
officers seemed to prefer systems that
displayed decision making data that was not
heavily filtered or preprocessed (Hutchins et
al. 1996, Morrison 1998). They favored data in
its basic or original form (velocities, heading,
range etc.) and not summed or fused into more
complex abstract concepts such as threats or
planning forms. In a study with similar
findings Vicente (2003) reported that in health

50

care, professionals seemed to perform better
with less complex systems. That study
suggests that serious medical errors were
intercepted more often with simple systems in
contrast to more sophisticated systems. One
explanation is that more complex systems are
given unwarranted prestige and diagnoses by
these systems were not as often questioned as
they should be.
System principle 6:
The system should be simple to use and
not overly filter or over process the original
data
Support feature matching and story telling
Experienced decision makers on preexisting teams seem to rely of two basic
strategies for decision making in a crisis
(Klein 1993). The most common strategy is to
match the problem features of the crisis to
known problem types. If this fails, decision
makers tend to create a story that succinctly
explains the situation and provides guidance
on necessary next steps. In feature matching,
the pattern or story, once recognized,
immediately suggests a course of action
without consideration of alternatives. In story
telling, once a story is generated, the decision
maker begins to act on that story and
continually evaluates and adjusts the story
until the crisis is resolved. As a result, the
crisis system should support feature matching
and adaptive story telling by helping the
decision makers to categorize the crisis
according to features, to record or edit the
working story and to integrate the available
information into a context or story, which
may include a history of events, the presumed
goals and capacities of key systems, potential
risks, and opportunities..
System principle 7:
Help reduce mental effort by
supporting feature matching and adaptive story
telling.
Reduce cognitive overload
One of the most significant limitations
on decision making during a crisis is the
cognitive overload highlighted in Table 1. As a
result, the crisis IT system should be designed
to reduce this load. One technique for the
system is to represent physical object (e.g.
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aircraft, patients, uranium levels) data as
trends over time or on other scales. This will
help the decision maker be more informed as
changing quantities of physical objects will be
displayed and not committed to memory and
compared over time.
Another technique is to minimize
manipulations or calculations by the decision
making team (Tolcott 1992). For example,
during a decent a pilot often must calculate
whether the current rate of descent will be
sufficient to arrive at a point in space at the
correct altitude.
A final method to reduce overload is
for the system to support well known
categorizing and chunking of information. For
example systems should support categories of
malfunctions, categories of procedures, and
categories of crisis checklists. As the
flightdeck team completes a checklist on gear
malfunctions the flight deck team and the
collaborating experts on the ground can both
immediately display the next entire checklist
using aviation classification shorthand.
Another way to reduce mental workload by
categorizing information is to display
scenarios. For example the system should
allow teams to conduct ―what if‖ analysis such
as displaying fuel consumed if an aircraft has
to divert away from one airport to go to
another. Displays of physical objects,
calculations, and categorization by IT systems
can reduce cognitive overload.
System principle 8:
Display historical trends, minimize
calculations, and support chunking of
information in order to reduce cognitive
overload (Solodilova et al. 2003)
Direct attention efficiently
Crisis team members must continually
scan their environment as they resolve a crisis.
This requires team members to continually
shift their attention among a number of
ongoing tasks. As a result, a key risk is that an
important cue will be missed. Therefore, an IT
crisis system should be designed to aid the
team by altering members to important cues
when needed.
For example, a new head mounted
display for anesthesiologists will include the

display of an alert if key patient information
dips below specified levels (Sanderson et al.
2005). Anesthesiologists on the operating team
are required to monitor a wide variety of data
sources and participate with other surgical
members on the team and can have their
attention diverted from key data.
These cues should be immediately
obvious and should not require the user to take
action in order to obtain important information
(e.g. selecting windows, activating pop ups).
The crisis system should be simple and have a
single indicator to show if an alarm is present
and waiting.
System principle 9:
Provide a mechanism to direct the
attention of an operator to important events
while minimizing the cognitive costs of
interruption (Holbrook 2003)
Reduce confirmation bias
As mentioned earlier, during a crisis,
team members tend to latch onto an early
hypothesis and maintain it despite evidence to
the contrary. This is a form of confirmation
bias where decision makers become biased to
data that support their pattern or hypothesis
and appear deaf to disconfirming data. This
can be particularly dangerous during a crisis
when team members do not have the cognitive
resources to evaluate alternative explanations.
As a result, the system should help team
members to recognize if a hypothesis does not
fit the crisis situation. For example, in the
study of naval decision makers mentioned
earlier, the crisis system was designed to flag
misfit objects in a different color (where a
misfit object might be an aircraft that was
labeled hostile, but did not continue to behave
according to that profile).
System principle 10:
Mitigate the tendency of decision
makers to attend to only confirming
information (Morrison et al. 1998)
Adaptively aid
selection cycles

diagnosis

and

action

As mentioned earlier, most CRM
decision making research for experienced
decision makers in crisis suggests that experts
use pattern matching rather than more formal
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decision models to diagnose a situation. They
seem to almost immediately recognize a
situation and act rather than develop
alternatives, apply criteria, and determine a
solution that formal models suggest. However,
several studies have suggested that even when
a situation is accurately perceived, experienced
decision makers, when confronted with a once
in a lifetime crisis, can revert to novice like
performance when selecting a course of action
(McKinney and Davis 2003; Simmel and
Shelton 1987). As a result, the crisis system
should be designed to help the decision makers
evaluate alternative actions.
One of the design suggestions for the
large scale DERMIS system is for system
adaptation (Turoff et al. 2004). The system
adapts to the ongoing crisis as situations are
assessed and actions selected. This adaptation
takes several forms—letting participants know
who else is concerned with a particular issue at
this time, finding information the individual
should be aware of prior to action selection,
and helping users adapt their information
search. The adaptive system supports the
ongoing cycle of decisions and actions beyond
the first situation assessment.
System principle 11:
Compensate for deficiencies in action
selection and adaptively support the multiple
cycles of decision making (McKinney and
Davis 2003)
7. Communication
Communication in CRM is defined as a
process of exchanging ideas with verbal or non
verbal means. The CRM community uses the
classic objective ―sender-receiver‖ model to
explain
communication
and
suggest
challenges. This practical and measurable
perspective implies that communication occurs
when a signal leads to a common
understanding for both sender and receiver. In
addition, CRM trains pilots on the nonobjective aspects of communication including
the desire of participants to avoid looking
foolish, that people respond to both feelings
and facts, and the importance of trust
(Transport Canada 2002). Finally, CRM
identifies two roles that communication plays.
First, communication is the process that allows
teams of pilots to catch and correct errors and
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prevent them from exploding into crisis
(Hackman 1990; Helmreich, Merritt, and
Wilhelm 1999). Second, communication
supports all the other team activities on the
flightdeck such as decision making, workload
sharing, error detection, and situational
awareness (Sampson 1999).
Recent CRM studies have suggested
that communication for teams before they face
crisis is enhanced by the expression of
communication values (McKinney et al. 2003,
McKinney et al. 2005). Communication values
are catalysts for effective early performance of
teams. Like all values, communication values
are standards against which actions and
outcomes are judged; they are positive ideals
about communication. Communication values
include openness, questioning, candor,
attentiveness, respect, support, appreciation,
calmness, confirmation, assertiveness, non
judgmentalness, and turn taking. Early
expression of communication values provides
necessary guidance for team members on how
information will be exchanged, the context in
which communication is to be employed. Once
these values are surfaced, communication
processes can develop rapidly (Hirokawa and
Poole 1996).
System principle 12:
Enable and support communication
value sharing
While communication helps prevent
crisis, CRM also holds that crisis changes
communication (Jehn 1995; McKinney et al.
2005; Te‘eni 2001). One change is that during
a crisis more communication is upward (from
subordinate to leader) than in routine
operations. In addition, during a crisis, implicit
communication increases and teams shift from
an egalitarian horizontal communication
framework to a more classical hierarchical and
vertical structure where subordinates defer
more willingly to authority (Davis et al. 1991;
Weick 1990). Further, crisis also caused the
group leader to increase receptivity to
information from subordinates. New patterns
of communication are necessary to correct
errors during crisis. In any crisis there is a high
probability that false hypotheses will develop
and persist (Weick 1990). To overcome this,
what is needed is diversity of inputs and
hypotheses about situation assessment (―what
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is happening‖) (Weick and Sutcliffe 2001).
However, the human mind naturally seeks to
resolve dissonance (Festinger and Carlsmith
1959) and is prone to latch upon the first
―good‖ idea that comes along during a crisis
(Jehn 1999). It is largely through open
exchange
of
messages,
independent
verification, and redundancy that the existence
of false hypotheses can be detected and
corrected (Weick 1990).
System principle 13:
Aid increased vertical communication,
effective dissent, and alternative hypothesis
generation during crisis
8. Situational Assessment
Within
the
CRM
community,
situational awareness is defined as an accurate
perception of reality (Transport Canada 2002).
According to this view, every crew member
develops a "Theory of the Situation", an
assumption about the current state of affairs.
Further, if reality and an individual's Theory of
the Situation‖ differ significantly, a loss of
situational awareness (SA) occurs and an error
chain could begin (Transport Canada 2002).
As defined, situational awareness
appears to be an individual attribute. However,
CRM extends situational awareness to be a
team principle. This shared SA occurs when
the mental model of each member corresponds
to the actual state of affairs. To ensure a shared
SA, team members communicate to update
each other‘s SA, and if the communication
remains effective, team members develop and
maintain a common, shared mental model of
the situation. The resulting shared SA is vital
to performance according to a number of
studies (Serfaty et al. 1998). For example,
Orasanu (1990) found that the communication
between the captain and other crew members
facilitates the building of a shared SA and is
essential to high team performance. On the
other hand, many crew difficulties arise when
individual SAs do not overlap or when team
members do not recognize that other members
hold a different SA. Further, collaborating
experts in the organization may not share the
SA of the pre-existing team.
An aviation example of an IT system
designed to enhance shared SA is an electronic
checklist. These are lists of actions to

accomplish at predetermined times during a
flight and to respond to well documented
emergencies. Crews routinely accomplish 1020 checklists per flight and frequently practice
the 20 to 30 emergency checklists during
simulated flights. Checklists keep crew
members on the same page, and allow both
crewmembers to see at a glance a common
reference on how many steps or items remain,
the next item, and what has been
accomplished. These checklists became
electronic in order to allow the pilots to mark a
step as skipped or to take steps out of order
and not have to remember what was skipped.
The move from paper to electronic checklists
also made it much easier during an emergency
to interrupt a checklist to accomplish another
list and return to correct step in the first
checklist. Checklists enhance the shared
mental model of crewmembers by providing a
common model on the current state of affairs.
With this system, greater collaboration with
ground based support is possible. The status
(complete, postponed, and incomplete) of each
item should be transmitted to these experts to
enhance the shared SA among the extended
team.
System principle 14:
Enhance accuracy and sharing of
common models on the state of affairs

SUMMARY
To date, little work has investigated
supporting the collaborative needs of preexisting teams that face crisis. The uniqueness
of the crises event suggests that in addition to
automated support, teams that face crisis
would benefit from real time collaboration
from other experts in the organization.
The goal of this investigation was to
develop an initial list of guiding principles for
IT systems to support the collaboration need of
teams in crisis. To accomplish this, two main
frameworks of crisis were reviewed. The first,
High Reliability Organizations, suggests that
to mitigate the effects of crisis, organizations
should be preoccupied with failure, avoid
simplifications, attend to operations, commit
to resilience, and defer to expertise. The
second, Crew Resource Management posits
that crisis teams must effectively make
decisions, communicate, and share situational
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assessment to effectively response to crisis.
Using these eight activities 14 specific guiding
principles, of a CCIT system were presented.
Future research should further refine
this list, evaluate its completeness, and assess
its generalizability. However, future studies
will face the same challenge as the present
one--empiricism is difficult. The uniqueness

and risk of crisis makes it fundamentally
difficult to collect a sufficient number of
observations from one context or conduct
experiments. On the other hand, as cockpit
voice recorders and flight data recorders
become more common, more scientific
analysis of the system principles suggested
here might be increasingly possible.

APPENDIX
General Design Principles and Specifications for DERMIS (Turoff et al. 2004)
Design Principle 1 - System Directory: The system directory should provide a hierarchical
structure for all the data and information currently in the system and provide a complete text
search to all or selected subsets of the material.
Design Principle 2 - Information Source and Timeliness: In an emergency it is critical that every
bit of quantitative or qualitative data brought into the system dealing with the ongoing emergency
be identified by its human or database source, by its time of occurrence, and by its status. Also,
where appropriate, by its location and by links to whatever it is referring to that already exists
within the system.
Design Principle 3 - Open Multi - Directional Communication: A system such as this must be
viewed as an open and flat communication process among all those involved in reacting to the
disaster.
Design Principle 4 - Content as Address: the content of a piece of information is what determines
the address.
Design Principle 5 - Up-to-Date Information and Data: Data that reaches a user and/or his/her
interface device must be updated whenever it is viewed on the screen or presented verbally to the
user.
Design Principle 6 - Link Relevant Information and Data: An item of data and its semantic links
to other data are treated as one unit of information that is simultaneously created or updated.
Design Principle 7 - Authority, Responsibility, and Accountability: Authority in an emergency
flows down to where the actions are taking place.
Design Principle 8 – Psychological and sociological factors: Encourage and support the
psychological and social needs of the crisis response team.
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